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the African post-colonial state has attracted much interest from scholars and development practitioners 
because of the recognition that development cannot take off without a functioning state. A state is expected to deliver goods and services 
to its citizens in order to uphold its legitimacy. However, in a fragile/post-conflict setting, state capacity to deliver services is hindered by 
inherent challenges – poor infrastructure, weak public service delivery and state institutions. The paper posits that a combination of the 
inability of fragile states to perform their governance functions and the adoption of “one-size-fits-all” strategies to deliver services have 
largely contributed to social exclusion in service delivery. 
The reflections and judgments contained in this paper are, however, those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position 
of the African Capacity Building Foundation.
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ABSTRACT
The post-colonial state in Africa has attracted great interest from scholars and development 
partners because of the recognition that no development can take place without a proper 
functioning state. The state is expected to provide and deliver goods and services to its citizens in 
order to promote its legitimacy before its citizens. However, in fragile or post-conflict states, the 
capacity of the state to deliver services to all citizens is not possible because of weak infrastructure, 
weak public service delivery and weak state institutions which lack the capacity to deliver service and 
thereby become illegitimate. This has led to the increasing recognition that service delivery 
interventions or initiatives in fragile states should aim to ameliorate the negative effects of social 
exclusion of marginalized and vulnerable groups. Against this backdrop, this paper discusses how 
social inclusion can be promoted and improved by service delivery in fragile states in Africa in the 
light of the fact that their different contextual variables (such as history, politics, culture and 
geographical location) affect their ability to develop their capacity to deliver services to their 
citizens. In other words, why is social exclusion in service delivery in fragile states challenging and 
what are the reasons for it? The paper shows that a combination of the inability of fragile states to 
perform their governance functions as a result of their peculiar circumstances and the adoption of 
the “one-size-fits-all” strategies to deliver services have largely contributed to social exclusion in 
service delivery. It ends with some policy recommendations.
KEY WORDS: social inclusion; service delivery; state legitimacy and fragility; state capacity; 
fragile/post-conflict countries; governance functions;  Africa.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The post-colonial state in Africa has attracted interest in four thematic areas: state consolidation, 
state decline, state fragility or failure, and state capacity building. State consolidation, which came 
into vogue in the immediate post-independence era, emanated from the underlying assumption that 
the state was a major means to bring about societal change and fulfill economic and social 
aspirations with strong integrative and development objectives (Herbst 2000). The shift to state 
decline from the mid 1970s focuses on analyzing what went wrong with the state and the reasons for 
its weakness. The state proved incapable of bringing about intended changes in society and was seen 
as built on rather doubtful foundations of legitimacy. The state was variously characterized as 
“prismatic” (Riggs, 1964), “soft” (Myrdal, 1968), “weak” (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982), 
“overdeveloped” (Leys, 1976), plagued by “precapitalist affectation” (Hyden, 1983) and “anti-
development” (Dwivedi and Nef, 1982) because of its inability to meet the aspirations not only of civil 
society but also those who occupied central political institutions (Azarya, 1988). This 
characterization was a major cause not only of economic decline experienced by most African 
countries during the 1970s and 1980s but also a weakening of governmental capacity and 
effectiveness, which in turn hindered efforts at economic revival via structural adjustment (Jeffries, 
1993).
Given the incapacity of the state to implement structural adjustment programs (SAPs), the World 
Bank and other donors in the 1980s moved toward “rolling back the state,” that is, restricting the role 
of the state, providing greater opportunity for market forces to assert themselves on the 
development process, and liberalizing the economy in an effort to induce economic development. 
The concern also involves building administrative capacity as an instrumentality of the development 
process rather than of a spoils system and the development of more efficient and, in a sense, more 
autonomous state machines. Various panaceas have been suggested, including administrative 
reform covering areas such as organizational development, manpower development, training, and 
the introduction of management techniques along the lines of the New Public Management School 
(Schaffer, 1969; Levy, 2004; Haque, 2001).
State fragility or failure refers to states that have mostly emerged from conflict and are regarded as 
lacking the political commitment, will, and capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies, 
which has led to either dismal or no service delivery and social exclusion (OECD/DAC, 2005). The U.K. 
Department for International Development in 2005 referred to these states as “difficult 
environments.” To deal with the problems of fragile states, a Fragile State Group was formed within 
the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organisationfor Economic Development and Co-
operation (OECD) in 2005.
Behind this great interest in the state is the recognition that the state is the pivot that will promote 
socioeconomic development. The basic function of state, which comprises a number of institutions 
that make and implement decisions with regard to interests of various kinds, is to provide goods and 
services to citizens based on “realization and representation of public interests and its possession of 
unique public qualities compared to business management” (Haque, 2001: 65).
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2The a link between service provision and taxation creates a contract between the state and citizens 
and thereby promotes state legitimacy. People pay taxes because they see it as a fiscal contract 
between them and the state, which they expect in return to provide services. For example, South 
Africans are found to be more likely to pay for local service charges if they felt that the government 
was providing services equitably, collecting revenue fairly, and using the revenue to provide services 
(Fjeldstad, 2004). Legitimacy comes in large part from government delivery of services that people 
want and need. Fiscal capacities are needed to build a legitimate state. Democratic elections do not 
themselves ensure state legitimacy. Neither do “quick impact projects” in which foreign aid agencies 
seek to fill urgent needs. Unfortunately, however, in most African states, public services provision is 
unreliable, and services are regarded as of poor quality where they have been provided. The weak 
link between taxes paid and services provided to citizens has exacerbated poverty in most African 
countries and sometimes eroded the legitimacy of some governments (Brautigam et al., 2008).
The effective provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, security, justice, health, 
education, electricity, and agriculture extension, is a major challenge for development (World Bank, 
2003). In many developing countries, the poor—especially the rural poor—receive inferior services 
in terms of access, quantity, and quality. This situation is exacerbated or magnified in fragile or post-
conflict societies where destruction has left the state without the resources to provide the services 
and vulnerable groups are excluded. Poor people and marginalized groups such as women and 
children lack access to services in fragile states for a number of reasons. These include deliberate 
social exclusion (on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, caste, tribe, race, or political affiliation), 
remote geography, inappropriate services, high real and/or opportunity costs, or security concerns. 
There is therefore the issue of dealing with social exclusion—ensuring that institutions and 
communities do not engage in practices that deliberately exclude access for particular groups (Berry 
et al., 2004).
Why is social exclusion in service delivery in fragile states such a daunting challenge? Fragile states 
are unable to perform their governance functions as a result of their peculiar circumstances. The 
problem is exacerbated by the adoption of “one-size-fits-all” strategies that too often have 
compounded social exclusion in service delivery. This paper explores how social inclusion can be 
promoted and improved by service delivery in fragile states in Africa when strategies take into 
account the way their different contextual variables (such as history, politics, culture and 
geographical location) affect their ability to develop their capacity to deliver services to their 
citizens. It is instructive to note that Africa has 20 fragile or post conflict countries/areas, majority of 
which are among the poorest in the world and where social exclusion is regarded as one of the major 
reasons behind the conflicts. With the exception of North Africa, fragile states exist in the remaining 
sub-regions of Africa probably because of their heterogeneity unlike the comparatively 
homogenous Arab-speaking North (see Table 1). 
3Fragile environments or states are weak in infrastructure, public service delivery, state institutions, 
and lack the capacity to deliver service and thereby become illegitimate. In other words, fragile 
states lack developmental capacity; they are unable to design and implement policies and programs 
for growth or to provide good governance to their societies and markets. They are characterized by a 
lack of political will, which means that policy makers and politicians will not push forward a pro-poor 
agenda. The state lacks the capacity to supply services to poor people. They are frequently weak in 
policymaking, implementation, and monitoring systems, and exhibit a lack of organizational 
providers and front line workers as well as limited financial resources. Infrastructure is also weak or 
non-existent, with few buildings or health clinics (Call and Wyeth, 2008). While this may be true of 
many developing countries, in fragile states the problems are particularly acute and exacerbated by 
such factors as limited access to certain parts of the country because of challenges of geography and 
security. In these situations, it will be difficult for the government to supply medicines or textbooks 
in some areas; and teachers, doctors, and nurses are reluctant to work in remote or inaccessible 
regions. In contexts with high HIV and AIDS prevalence, the human resources available to staff clinics 
or schools, or to manage the provision of services, are decimated (Berry et al., 2004; Gobyn, 2006; 
Mcloughlin, 2009).
The complex interplay between political will and state capacity poses major obstacles to access and 
participation of poor people in service delivery. Where political will is lacking, certain groups have 
been deliberately excluded from social services on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, caste, 
race, or political affiliation. In situations of weak state capacity, marginalized groups are unable to 
access services either because of their geographical location or because the services available do not 
meet their needs or have high real and/or opportunity costs. Where security is a problem, access has 
been curtailed because of the behavior of different parties to the conflict (Berry et al., 2004; Gobyn, 
2006; Mcloughlin, 2009).
Above all, fragile states also lack good governance, which in turn does not permit them to create and 
maintain accountable and efficient institutions. In the midst of all these problems, they urgently 
need to provide and deliver services to gain legitimacy or respect from citizens and thereby promote 
social inclusion. To do this, state institutions will have to be built, transformed, and strengthened to 
provide services for all citizens. Where state building is the central objective, states gain legitimacy 
by being seen to provide services as part of the social contract with the citizens (Batley and 
Mcloughlin, 2009). 
Table 1: Post-conflict countries/areas in Africa
1. Angola 7. Eritrea 14. Rwanda
2. Burundi 8. Ethiopia 15. Sierra Leone
3. Central African Republic 9. Gambia 16. Somalia
4. Chad 10. Guinea 17. Sudan
5. Congo, Democratic    11. Liberia 18. Togo
    Republic 12. Mozambique 19. Uganda
6. Côte d’Ivoire 13. Niger 20. Zimbabwe
Source: Compiled from World Bank,“Conflict-Affected Countries,” Washington: World Bank, 2006.
4II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN FRAGILE/POST
-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
Fragile states pose a different development problem for service delivery. Consequently, the 
importance of service delivery in a fragile environment cannot be over-emphasized, given that 
failure to deliver basic services such as security, health, education, and justice is regarded as both a 
cause and a characteristic of fragility (van de Walle, 2006). The literature has indicated the impacts of 
fragility on service delivery. They include inequitable coverage and access leading to social exclusion; 
the proliferation of non-state service providers, including international non-governmental 
organizations; and the breakdown of long-standing route accountability (Collier, 2007 a; b; DfID, 
2005; Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005). 
Service delivery is seen as mitigating social exclusion, which itself is often regarded as a driver of 
fragility and conflict. The delivery of basic services is regarded as a central task of poverty reduction 
because water, education, health care, and personal security have been identified as poor people's 
highest priorities, while expanding inclusive service delivery is critical to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDG targets represent a global commitment to realizing the rights 
of the poor to services and livelihood opportunities. They will not be met without increased access to 
services in fragile environments (World Bank, 2003).
Basic service delivery and improvement may also be an entry point for major or broader governance 
reforms. It is instructive to note that where upstream governance weaknesses or lack of capacity are 
contributory factors, the governance reforms that are necessary to promote longer-term social and 
political change have more chance of success if linked to reforms in service delivery, which have 
tangible results and benefit the public in a noticeable way. When visible to the public, service delivery 
reforms are regarded as offering a more promising entry point for broader governance reforms, 
since they can then lead to pressure for wider, more systemic reforms. For instance, in 2004, 
targeted improvements in policing in Nigeria sent a powerful message to inspire others and created 
a policy space with the potential to conduct more comprehensive reform (Thompson, 2004).
There is a link between service delivery and peace building. Therefore, in post-conflict countries, 
service delivery helps to alleviate the suffering of large war-weary populations and contributes to 
consolidating the peace process. Delivery of services such as health and education can play an 
important role in preventing conflict or exacerbating it. Distribution of resources and the 
accessibility by or deliberate denial to different groups may either address or heighten existing social 
inequalities. Improved service delivery has the potential to promote equality and inclusiveness and 
to be a tool for peace-building. Service delivery can strengthen the representation of excluded 
people, for example, through user groups. Reducing inequalities in access to basic services reduces 
potential causes of violent conflict. The literature on the role of horizontal inequalities (that is, the 
inequality between groups in society often based on ethnicity or other group characteristics) in 
conflict highlights the importance of considerations of equity in the provision of services. This work 
argues that group exclusion along social, economic, and/or political lines is a source of 
differentiation and is one of the potential triggers of conflict (Stewart, 1999; Klugman, 1999; Ostby, 
52003: Berry et al., 2004). Access to services is one of the factors contributing to such differentiation. 
Exclusion from services, in particular education, has been highlighted as a factor in conflict in 
countries as diverse as Burundi, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Kosovo (Jackson, 2000; Perera et al., 2004; 
High Level Forum on the Health MDGs, 2005; Vaux and Visman, 2005; Fragile States Group, 2007; 
Eldon and Waddington, 2008).
Service delivery can improve gender balance and therefore reduce gender inequality, given that one 
of the most universal forms of social exclusion (and one that is prevalent in the context of fragile 
environments) targets women, girls, and children, who suffer disproportionately as a result of 
conflict or instability. The importance of service delivery to mainstreaming gender and 
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accountability has been recognized by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness , the Accra Agenda 
2
for Action , and the MDGs. They all point to equal rights for women and men in access to service 
delivery because men and women are affected differently by the poverty, lack of access to justice, 
and physical insecurity that often characterize fragile states. The sensitivity to an understanding of 
these differential impacts has also engaged the attention of the donor community (World Bank, 
2007; Baranyi and Powell, 2005; DfID, 2008; BRIDGE, 2003). The point to note is that gender analysis 
is seen to have assisted in identifying the differential impacts of fragility on men and women; how 
gender affects access to resources and power; and social and cultural constraints on promoting 
gender. 
To what extent is gender a strong thread running through thinking on fragile states, and what 
opportunities exist to enhance the systematic integration of gender equality? Addressing these 
questions has led to the publications of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) (2009) and 
3
Braxton (2007) on gender budgeting . They give examples of some fragile states, such as Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe, that use gender budgeting as a tool to improve transparency and 
accountability in the fight against inequity and poverty, both of which are issues of governance. The 
publications drawing on the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
highlight national and sectoral gender budgeting experiences in the three countries and offer best 
practice models for other African countries. Perhaps its major finding is: “Budgets are not gender 
neutral. They affect women and men in different ways, reflecting the uneven distribution of power 
within society as economic disparities, different living conditions, and ascribed social roles. Despite 
being signatories to the major international agreements that call for gender equality, most African 
countries have fallen short of their promises as their gender initiatives are facing a host of challenges 
relating to policy implementation, programme design, management and tracking, and capacity 
building issues” (ACBF, 2009: 3-4). Thus, capacity building in the area of budgeting has the potential 
to promote social inclusion in service delivery among women and men.
1 
See The High Level Forum, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results   
 and Mutual Accountability, March 2, 2005.
2 
The Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (The Accra Agenda for Action), September 4, 2008.
3 
Gender budgeting may be defined as the incorporation of processes and tools to ensure sensitivity of government budget  
  and its impact on gender. See Braxton, G. (2007) “Gender Budgeting as a Tool for Poverty Reduction: Concepts, Practices 
  and Capacity Building Implications”, ACBF Working Paper No. 13 (September): 1-39.
6Service delivery has been regarded as an entry point for local governance reform in fragile states. 
Local governance in fragile states does not totally collapse. There are mainly four not mutually 
exclusive situations in local governance in fragile states (Stewart and Brown, 2009; Pavanello and 
Darcy, 2008). They are: 
(i) strong state centralization and control of local level state institutions; these maylack democratic 
participation and central state/government will, but not capacity to serve all citizens equitably 
with services for promotion as well as lack of strong civil society organizations. An example of 
this situation could be found in Angola; 
(ii) extensive formal democratic decentralization and a long history of active civil society 
organizations, but de facto state-centralized control that undermines democracy and equitable 
service provision. Non-state authorities such as traditional leaders are often co-opted by the 
regime. There is a lack of central government will, but not state capacity to distribute equitably 
services. Zimbabwe is an example of this situation; 
(iii) decentralization by default where non-state actors fill the gap of absent state and formal local 
government institutions in terms of service delivery and security. Non-state actors may include 
traditional authorities (chiefs/elders), warlords, militias, religious leaders, vigilante groups, and 
non-governmental organizations. The examples are Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and 
Liberia; and
(iv) state officials and local government institutions present in local arenas, but detached from 
central state regulation and linked to informal, non-state power-holders (warlords, 
commanders, customary authorities, religious leaders), and partly financed by illicit economics 
as in Afghanistan (DIIS, 2008; Samson and Macquene, 2006; Paul, 2005; Berry et al., 2004; Collier, 
2007a).
These four situations not only produce social exclusion in service delivery but also have led to the 
risks of reproducing state fragility, which has been partly caused by the informal decentralization of 
governance, and strengthening centrifugal forces and fragmentation. It is to reduce these risks that 
service delivery becomes an appropriate entry point for reforming local governance, given that in all 
four situations there are high levels of poverty among local populations and inequitable distribution 
of services and marginalization, irrespective of the degree or quality of service or who delivers them. 
Service delivery can improve the livelihoods of poor populations and thereby boost the legitimacy of 
the state and of local governance institutions. Furthermore, it is also an entry point for capacity 
building of local service providers and triggers local democratic action by mobilizing citizens around 
demands for services and participation in planning processes (Joshi, 2008; DIIS, 2008; Brosio, 2009).
In short, service delivery does promote and enhance social inclusion and thus mitigate social 
exclusion because of its emphasis on coverage, access, quantity and quality of service delivered. It 
may provide large long-term returns in terms of the equity, effectiveness, and efficiency of the 
services provided. Service delivery has the potential of breaking the inter-generational cycle of 
poverty, can increase economic opportunity, and can promote cooperation across social dividing 
lines. The Chars Livelihood Programme in Bangladesh, for instance, developed a useful conceptual 
model in 2000 of how service delivery interventions incorporated opportunities for the poor to 
exercise their voice, create political space, and, in the long term, fundamentally alter their 
relationship with elite groups (Hobley, 2004; Stewart and Brown, 2009; UNU-WIDER, 2008).
7The challenge of delivering basic services to poor people and in a fragile environment is more urgent 
than ever and is central to achieving the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The 2004 World Development Report (WDR) emphasizes that improving services is not just about 
providing resources, skills, and technical solutions. It also puts the spotlight on politics and on the 
institutional arrangements that create incentives for different stakeholders. It captures much of 
what has been learned about different forms of provision; employs an analytical framework based 
on principal-agency relationships to explore why accountability links between policymakers, service 
providers and citizen consumers so often break down; and looks at ways of strengthening these, 
including more direct action by poor people to seek accountability from service providers (World 
Bank, 2003; Institute of Development Studies, 2005).
Service delivery in fragile states is also key because the twenty-first century witnessed an extension 
of governmental functions beyond all precedent. The concept of the service and welfare state is 
almost universally accepted. The public sector has taken upon itself responsibility for the direction 
and utilization of manpower, natural resources, and the fast-growing technology of the modern 
world for the creation of an environment conducive to widespread economic and social well-being. 
Citizen demands on the public sector have become insistent as people grow less and less resigned to 
lives of poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance. And more and more, particularly in developing 
countries, the public sector is seen as the agency to meet these urgent demands and devise new 
forms of public administration to overcome social and economic deficiencies (Lane, 1993; Braibant, 
1996; Haque, 2001).
In a nutshell, service delivery is seen as mitigating social exclusion, which itself is often regarded as a 
driver of fragility and conflict. The renewed interest in service delivery and social inclusion may 
therefore be summarized as follows:
• Fragile states are not on track to meet the MDGs.
• Poor governance mechanisms inhibit poverty reduction and pro-poor service delivery.
• Fragile states generate adverse externalities regionally and globally (such increased potential 
for conflict or supporting organized crime).
• Ethical and humanitarian reasons require continued engagement.
• Fragile states inhibit the exchange and growth of global public goods, such as eliminating 
infectious diseases, improving the environment, and enhancing trade opportunities.
(Source: DfID, 2010)
Service delivery that is pro-poor in nature has also become important because:
• If the aid community does not provide assistance to service delivery in fragile states, the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will not be achieved.
• There is a humanitarian imperative to intervene where people's access to basic services has been 
reduced or withdrawn.
• Service delivery may offer an entry point for triggering longer term pro-poor social and political 
change.
 • Service delivery may help to prevent some states from sliding into, or back into, civil conflict. 
(Source: DfID, 2010)
8Basic service delivery and improvement may also be an entry-point for major governance reforms. 
Long-term social and political changes supporting good governance have more chance of success if 
linked to reforms in service delivery with tangible results. When these improvements are visible to 
the public, they can lead to pressure for wider and more systemic reforms (Collier, 2007a). 
Improvements in services can be a “tangible peace dividend in countries emerging from 
conflict—especially 'quick wins' or quick impact projects that tackle high visible problems.” (Berry et 
al., 2004:12). Moreover, improvements in service delivery can potentially strengthen long-term 
accountability, that is, the critical relationship between citizens (clients) and policy makers. A central 
challenge and opportunity in post-conflict states is to find ways of building new mechanisms for 
accountability into service delivery initiatives (Fragile States Group, 2007). This has led some scholars 
to recommend a rights-based approach to programming as crucial in the achievement of long-term 
and sustainable empowerment of marginalized groups (Evans, 2008; Stewart et al., 2007; DIIS, 
2009).
9III. THE FIVE GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS OF FRAGILE STATES
Fragile/post-conflict countries face special problems and challenges. They include state incapacity to 
deliver services, fewer resources available for public health as most funding is diverted to military 
spending, emigration of health personnel, large numbers of refugees, continuing civil disorder, run-
down infrastructure, small industrial and service sectors, and very poor data collection capabilities 
(Meagher, 2008). Accordingly, the most immediate and important task facing post-conflict 
countries is strengthening their capacity to carry out the following five categories of governance and 
redevelopment functions (UN, 2007), which are contained in Table 2. The table shows that thirty two 
expected interventions will have to be undertaken by governments and the international 
community if the five governance functions will have to be effectively performed to promote social 
exclusion. 
Source: Adapted fromUnited Nations (2007) The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post Conflict 
Countries, ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/101 (New York: UN), p. 17
Functions
1. Establishing safety and 
security
2. Establishing or 
strengthening 
constitutional government
3. Strengthening justice and 
reconciliation 
organizations
4. Implementing recovery 
and reconstruction 
programmes
5. Growing the economy 
equitably
32 Expected Interventions
(I) enforcing peace agreements; (ii) reconstituting security forces; (iii) 
ensuring public order and safety; (iv) demobilizing and disarming ex-
combatants; (v) securing territorial borders; (vi) strengthening police; 
and (vii) reintegrating ex-combatants.
(I) enacting a new or amended constitution; (ii) establish mechanisms 
for electiosn and citizen participation; (iii) strengthening executive, 
legislative and judicial agencies; (iv) providing for local governance; (v) 
guaranteeing freedom for civil society and the media; and (vi) 
protecting human and political rights.
(I) rebuilding the justice system; (ii) protecting human and property 
rights; (iii) strengthening oversight of police; (iv) establishing truth 
and reconciliation organizations; (iv) enhancing community re-
building programmes; and (v) integrating belligerent groups in society
(I) restoring public services; (ii) re-building infrastructure; (iii) 
providing shelter and food relief; (iv) reopening and extending 
education and health facilities; (v) assisting refugees and displaced 
persons; (vi) extending social protection of vulnerable populations; 
and (vii) developing public-private partnerships for reconstruction.
(I) stabilizing the currency; (ii) reforming financial, economic and 
regulatory institutions; (iii) increasing production; (iv) promoting 
trade and investment; (v) strengthening the private sector; (vi) 
promoting job creation; developing and extending safety nets; and 
(vii) developing human skills.
Table 2: Governance functions in fragile/postconflict societies
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1. Strengthening governance and participation: This involves the creation of a strong state in a 
timely fashion to strengthen the governing authority ability to provide security, eliminate violent 
conflict, protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, extend basic services, control 
corruption, respond effectively to emergencies, and combat poverty and inequality (Rondinelli 
and Montgomery, 2005). A fundamental problem fragile environment face is the government's 
weak absorptive capacity and weaknesses in infrastructure, human resources, domestic 
financial resources, and administrative capability. What is required, therefore, is some degree of 
political stability and legitimacy and respect for law, which requires strengthening not only the 
legislative and judicial systems, but the executive branch as well. 
To restore governance, it is also necessary to create or strengthen mechanisms for widespread 
participation in governance and public decision-making (UNDP, 2004). In its reconstruction 
efforts in Uganda during the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the World Bank (1998) 
found that its economic rebuilding efforts could have been improved by giving more attention to 
consensus building and wider participation in decision-making.In many post-conflict countries, 
such as Ethiopia and Mozambique, civil servants had to prepare quickly for elections to establish 
a legitimate government and expand participation in the democratic process. In some countries, 
this came through early elections; in others like, Sierra Leone and Rwanda, it came by creating 
and extending institutions for participative local and regional decision-making through some 
form of decentralization, federation, or power-sharing (Rondinelli, 2006; UNECA, 2003; 
Devarajan and Widlund, 2007).
It is instructive to note that the governments of post-conflict countries need the capacity to carry 
out all their tasks at the same time while ensuring the accountability, transparency and integrity 
of their actions. Failure to attend to one set of problems often had a negative impact on a 
government's ability to deal with others. Widespread corruption often undermines 
government's capacity to carry out all of the other reconstruction tasks and weakens trust in 
public sector leaders. For example, in Sierra Leone, a high level of corruption in the post-conflict 
period was a serious problem. It threatened the legitimacy and efficacy of the government, 
which had limited success because it did not have the authority to prosecute, had few trained 
professional investigators, and relied on police officers from the old corrupt system to 
investigate and refer cases to the Attorney General's office for prosecution. As a result, very few 
cases were prosecuted. The lack of tangible results led to frustration and disillusionment among 
both the people of Sierra Leone and the donor community (UN, 2007; International Crisis Group, 
2004; Call and Wyeth, 2008).
Other important tasks that public administrators are called on to carry out are strengthening 
public information systems; stabilizing fiscal management; and reestablishing basic government 
services in all parts of the country. Local governance and administrative systems may have to be 
created, restored, or reorganized, and local government or sub-national administrative units 
may have to be staffed or re-staffed (World Bank, 1998). 
2. Establishing safety and security: In most post-conflict countries, the government must have 
public administrators who can move quickly to secure the peace and provide protection and 
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safety. Experience in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Rwanda, and Ethiopia illustrates that 
unless the governing authority can quickly ensure security and a peaceful settlement of conflict, 
little progress can be made in establishing a strong national government, reconstructing 
infrastructure, and creating the foundation for economic growth (Caplan, 2002; Rondinelli, 
2006).
In countries such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Liberia, where UN peacekeeping forces played an 
important role in maintaining internal security and ending the civil war, governments must 
quickly build up their own capacity to protect their citizenry through reforms of the civil service, 
police and civil defense forces, and justice systems. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, government had 
to strengthen its capacity to pursue disarmament, demobilize and reintegrate fighters, 
repatriate refugees, and improve security, protect civil rights, and prevent criminal capture of 
the economy (International Crisis Group, 2004).
3. Providing for emergency humanitarian needs and social wellbeing: Crucial functions of 
government that fall heavily on public administrators, either directly or in conjunction with 
NGOs, include providing for emergency humanitarian needs, resettling ex-combatants and 
internally displaced persons, and providing basic social services throughout the country. In many 
post-conflict countries, the civil service may have to play a strong temporary role in reintegrating 
ex-combatants and returning migrants into the economy and society in order to reduce social 
tensions and prevent future outbreaks of hostilities or rampant crime and violence. The 
experiences of the International Labour Office (ILO) in the war-torn countries of Mozambique, 
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and others led it to conclude 
that the employment options in the years following cessation of conflict are limited for ex-
combatants and that those who are reintegrated find employment most often in micro and small 
enterprises. Government has a vital role in creating the conditions that allow expansion of small 
enterprises and in preparing ex-combatants and displaced migrants to participate in income-
earning activities (Specht, 2000; Rondinelli, 2006). 
As the World Bank found in its assistance programmes for reintegrating ex-combatants into the 
economy in postwar Mozambique, the government often needed to develop programmes that 
concentrated on informal-sector apprenticeship training and provide grants to master 
craftsmen and small and micro-enterprise employers for equipment, salaries, and materials. 
Sustaining the retraining and employment programmes for ex-combatants in Mozambique was 
closely linked to access to markets, transport, and credit and to weaning beneficiaries off grant 
dependency quickly so that they developed a self-reliance mentality (World Bank, 1997). 
To succeed in post-conflict reconstruction and development, government must strengthen its 
administrative capacities to develop human capital, reduce poverty, promote social equity, and 
alleviate social problems, while at the same time strengthening the economy and rebuilding the 
state. For example, although Uganda is often cited by international assistance organizations as a 
model for post-conflict reconstruction, the World Bank acknowledges that structural 
adjustment and economic growth policies would have been more successful had the Bank and 
the government given more attention to health sector reforms and found ways of improving the 
efficiency of educational investment (World Bank, 1998a). 
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4. Stabilizing the economy and providing infrastructure: Stimulating economic growth and 
rebuilding infrastructure—for the country as a whole and especially for areas where hostilities 
were most intense—have been essential functions of government officials in fragile societies. 
Nearly all government ministries and agencies must rebuild or replace the physical infrastructure 
through which they deliver services, and public administrators must work with the private sector 
in situations where government alone does not have the technical, managerial, or financial 
resources to provide infrastructure effectively (World Bank, 1998b). Governments in post-
conflict countries also face myriad challenges in restoring destroyed or damaged economies. 
They must often restore confidence in their currency, strengthen fiscal policies and revenue 
collection, reform tax administration, and reestablish financial institutions. Creating capacity for 
debt management and effective resource allocation, liberalizing trade policies, and revising legal 
and regulatory frameworks to make doing business easier are preconditions in many post-
conflict countries for stimulating economic growth. This function has proved to be a daunting 
task in spite of several interventions by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. For 
instance, it was found in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire that stabilizing the economy and 
providing the needed infrastructure were not achieved as was expected in spite of massive 
funding by the donor community. This notwithstanding, the case of Rwanda is different as donor 
interventions led to the stabilization of the economy while infrastructural improvement was also 
recorded (UN, 2007; World Bank, 1998b; Call and Wyeth, 2008). 
5. Strengthening justice and reconciliation organizations: The ability of government in post-
conflict countries to establish safety and security and provide for humanitarian and social needs 
depends heavily on its ability to strengthen justice and reconciliation organizations. Among the 
varied tasks facing such governments are creating, strengthening, or expanding indigenous 
police forces; establishing or enhancing the criminal justice system; and protecting human and 
property rights. In some countries where minorities were persecuted or fighting factions 
brutalized the population, governments must establish war crime courts or truth and 
reconciliation organizations (Stone et al., 2005). 
Often, in post-conflict countries, public administrators must focus specifically on protecting the 
rights of women and providing services that help make them productive members of society and 
active participants in community-development decisions. Governments in post-conflict Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone faced complex challenges in responding to the need to increase the economic, social, 
and political participation of women and women's organizations. Gender-based programmes of 
assistance in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Rwanda were especially beneficial in the rural sector and to 
the poorest elements of the population. In helping organize women's groups, these programmes 
provided support to microfinance services that improved conditions for a local population, opened 
educational opportunities for females of all ages, and supported equal-opportunity standards in 
employment and promotion in both the public and the private sector (Kumar, 2001; World Bank, 
1998b; UN, 2007).
Each of these sets of functions is crucial in contributing to post-conflict reconstruction and is 
inextricably interrelated with each of the others. The boundaries among these set of functions are 
blurred and the ability to deal with one often requires strengthening other government capacities as 
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well. Some problems cut across several or all sets of functions that governments must perform 
during the period of post-conflict reconstruction. The interrelationships among them make the tasks 
more challenging and the need for stronger government capacity to carry them out more urgent 
(Gobyn, 2006; UN, 2007).
According to the UN (2007) the inextricable relationships among governance functions appeared as 
well in attempts by international organizations to strengthen the government in Liberia after the 
civil war. Improving the Liberian government's capacity for providing security required wider 
political, economic, and administrative changes. Technical assistance to the Ministry of Defence 
alone would have little impact without also creating an adequate constitutional framework that 
could legitimize the government, strengthen mechanisms for making the reform process 
accountable, improve parliamentary oversight and civilian leadership of defence forces, increase 
civil society involvement in maintaining security, and create mechanisms for civilian disarmament 
(Ebo, 2005).
The interrelationships among these tasks was also seen quite clearly in the enormous challenges 
international assistance organizations and the government faced in providing the infrastructure and 
services required to improve human welfare and living conditions in Sierra Leone. The entire 
government and the civil service had to be restructured to deliver services effectively. Sierra 
Leonean government initiated the task, with the help of the international community, by enacting 
decentralization. Following local elections in 2004, many of the functions of service provision were 
devolved to the local councils and chiefdoms. The Ministry of Local Government was successful in 
getting 19 local councils fully functional in providing basic social services to the people. These 
services included health and sanitation, agriculture, forest and food security as well as education, 
local commerce, and communication and transportation infrastructure. The government had to 
develop new ways of making inter-governmental fiscal transfers and of ensuring that local 
governments had adequate financial capacity to carry out their functions and responsibilities (UN, 
2007; DfID, 2010).
As the extant literature suggests, providing for emergency humanitarian needs, resettling ex-
combatants and internally displaced persons, and providing basic social services throughout the 
country, while at the same time ensuring safety and security, revitalizing the economy, creating or 
rebuilding a competent justice system and reconciling continuing hostilities among political, 
sectarian, ethnic or other factions — all of these are difficult tasks and each affects the ability of 
government to find satisfactory solutions to all of the others. For example, in many post-conflict 
countries (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and Burundi) the government may 
have to play a strong temporary role in reintegrating displaced people into the economy and society 
in order to reduce social tensions and prevent future outbreaks of hostilities or rampant crime and 
violence (Call and Wyeth, 2008). 
It is clear from what we have so far said that post-conflict states in Africa have not been able to 
adequately perform their five governance functions entrusted to them because of the myriad of 
challenges that have faced them. Even though there is provision in the functions for extending social 
protection to vulnerable groups, this has not been possible because of the extenuating 
circumstances in which post-conflict societies find themselves. Support and assistance have been 
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offered by the donor community, but the ineffective and weak capacity of the states in terms of 
resources and sometimes even legislation as well as their different histories and politics and have 
largely undermined their ability to perform the five governance functions. Moreover, the functions 
to be performed are more intimidating than those performed by functional states (Batley and 
Mcloughlin, 2009). 
IV. THE THREE STRATEGIES OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN FRAGILE STATES
Three strategies have been used for service delivery in fragile/post-conflict countries in Africa. They 
are: (i) purely humanitarian, project-based, short term approach; (ii) state delivery of services; and 
(iii) non-state delivery of services (DfID, 2005; BMZ, 2006; Collier, 2007a; Berry, 2009). It is, however, 
instructive to note that the strategies have exhibited three key features. First, they exhibit support 
for pro-poor service delivery as a highly complex long- term activity given the institutional and 
governance failures and protracted periods of violence and crisis. Second and more important, the 
strategies appear to be “one size fits all” approaches. Rather than take into account a sound and 
robust political analysis of specific context and sector, they have been accepted as universal 
blueprints. They have therefore been implemented in all fragile states in Africa and other developing 
countries with varying degrees of success (Mcloughlin, 2009; Gobyn, 2006; Chataigner and Gaulme, 
2005). As Rondinelli (2006: 21) rightly points out in terms of implementing administrative reforms:
Because one size does not fit all, all reforms in post-conflict societies must be based 
on strong assessments and diagnoses of country needs, political conditions and 
implementation visibility. One of the enduring lessons of experience is that 
reconstruction of public administration can succeed in post-conflict societies only if 
it meets indigenous needs; fits national economic, social and political conditions; 
and has the support of “champions” among the political and bureaucratic elites.
Third, it has been difficult to find the appropriate balance between responding to immediate 
humanitarian needs and building long-term capacity, engaging with the public sector and non-state 
providers (NSPs), and supporting and working with central and lower-level institutions (Pavanello 
and Darcy, 2008; Batley and Mcloughin, 2009).
The purely humanitarian, project-based short-term approach is the dominant mode of engagement 
in service delivery in post-conflict countries. It involves emergency relief provided by the UN and the 
international community in conjunction with national NGOs in an effort to stave off a humanitarian 
crisis. Newly established governments depend on large amounts of external assistance to be able to 
extend services, especially to marginalized and vulnerable groups. Providing health and education 
services, especially in refugee camps that can easily become recruitment grounds for militants, plays 
an important role in preventing renewed conflicts (Collier, 2007b; Joshi, 2008).
However, this mode of engagement has led to a fragmented and uncoordinated response that 
inadequately addressed the institutional failures and governance deficits that are the core of state 
fragility. The promotion of vertical, non-integrated programs, such as the creation of multiple 
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vertical or special programs to address the same health issues, has been perceived as creating 
mechanisms that bypass rather than include state institutions and systems. This, in turn, has 
undermined the already weak relationships of accountability and even created “new and often 
deeper institutional failures” (Commins, 2005; Berry et al., 2004; Meagher, 2008; Newbrander, 2007; 
Joshi, 2008). Consequently, it has been recognized that sponsored service delivery initiatives by the 
international community should be designed to involve rather than bypass the state so as to 
strengthen the institutional apparatus to ensure long-term, sustainable service provision and 
delivery.
The negative effect of the humanitarian approach has been emphasized in “Liberia: The Risks of Re-
building as Shadow State,”a chapter of Building States to Build Peace (2008).The author, Michael 
McGovern, reviews the experience of the international community in Liberia during its post-conflict 
transitional period and finds that deeply intrusive forms of intervention often risk long-term 
sustainability for medium-term success. The work argues that unless reforms and reconstruction are 
rooted in consultation and a sense of local ownership, they are likely to collapse as soon as donor 
interest and resources shift elsewhere. 
As noted earlier in this paper, effective reconstruction requires governments to create a strong state 
quickly and in such a fashion as to strengthen the capability of the governing authority.This enables 
the state to provide security, eliminate violent conflict, protect human rights, generate economic 
opportunities, extend basic services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies, and 
combat poverty and inequality (Rondinelli, 2006). “[I]n post-conflict situations, such as in Sierra 
Leone or Somalia, establishing some form of credible representative government that can provide 
essential services is increasingly seen as an essential part of the first stages of post-conflict 
reconstruction” (UNDP, 2004: 3).
Consequently, the first best solution for ensuring effective targeting of essential services in post-
conflict countries is to have a willing and capable state take responsibility. This is important for two 
reasons. First, states gain legitimacy by being seen to provide services as part of the social contract 
with citizens. Non-state provision of core state functions is seen to have a potentially negative 
impact on the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state (Ghani and Lockhart, 2005: 11). Second and 
more important, even if non-state actors are the direct providers of services to clients, there are 
some specific services (for example, vaccination) and some indirect coordination, oversight, and 
purchasing functions (setting policy frameworks and ensuring service provision by setting 
standards, coordinating, regulating, and financing) that independent providers left alone will not 
provide efficiently or at all (Collier, 2007a; Call and Wyeth, 2008).
For these reasons, in countries where there is some willingness and some capacity at the central 
government level, the national government is used as a partner by the international community in 
pro-poor policymaking to deliver services by strengthening state capacity and working directly with 
the state and its structures. Decisions as to where to engage, whether at the center or at lower 
levels, are based on a political analysis of the specific context aimed at locating capacity and will at 
different institutional levels (Berry et al., 2004). This is of crucial importance because in countries 
such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone, where lack of willingness at the central level was a significant 
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constraint to pro-poor service delivery, the international community found “pockets of willingness” 
or “entry points” within certain ministries or at least lower levels of government. In this way, the 
international community was able to build on existing pro-poor political will and work with lower-
level institutions aimed at integrating initiatives into government processes and structures in the 
longer term (Berry et al., 2004; Ranson et al., 2007; Meagher, 2008). Similarly, after the war in 
Uganda, UNICEF adopted the Ministry of Health by providing strong leadership and close 
collaboration in the health program. Eventually, responsibility was returned to the Ministry, which 
had developed significant capacity under UNICEF's mentorship (Carlson et al., 2005).
In some dysfunctional environments in Africa (for instance, Sierra Leone), the best option for 
ensuring service delivery to the largest number in need has been to use local governments and 
traditional authorities because they exercise real authority and retain more legitimacy than the 
national government (DIIS, 2008). However, even though local service delivery may be ideal for 
certain services such as potable water, the decision to work with local governments has incurred 
either the hostility of some national governments or added to the incoherence among disparate 
service initiatives across the countries (Meagher, 2008).
In some post-conflict countries (for instance, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and 
Ethiopia), the international community, apart from dealing with de jure state actors also dealt with 
de facto actors and structures such as dissident political movements or rebel groups in order to 
ensure access and continuity of service provision (Berry et al., 2004; Carlson et al., 2005; Call and 
Wyeth, 2008).
Non-state delivery of services is used where the dominant role of centralized line departments in the 
provision of public services has receded in the face of financial constraints, as public resources are 
inadequate to sustain significant levels of provision. Sustained conflict has prevented the central 
government from reaching populations in parts of a territory affected by conflict, with insecurity 
rendering consistent provision impossible. Policy initiatives to tackle such problems have 
emphasized alternative forms of service provision through private and non-governmental agencies. 
This means more limited involvement with government or, if necessary, avoidance in favor of non-
state providers. Delivery of services by private firms or NGOs is not necessarily inferior to delivery by 
the state, and in some countries is preferable, but state fragility inevitably reduces the role of the 
public sector in favor of non-state actors or non-state providers (NSPs) (Batley and Mcloughin, 
2009). It is instructive to note that the guiding principle of engagement with NSPs should be the 
international community engaging and partnering NSPs while also strengthening public institutions. 
It is important that initiatives premised on engagement with NSPs are not totally disconnected from 
the public service delivery track and that handover mechanisms are incorporated in program 
planning and designing from the very beginning to ensure the eventual transition from NSPs to state 
actors (Commins, 2008; Meagher, 2008).
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V. IMPACTS OF THE STRATEGIES ON SERVICE DELIVERY
The purely humanitarian, project-based short-term approach has been commonly used in all fragile 
countries in Africa and indeed, all over the world. It is the first entry point in trying to restore basic 
services to fragile environments; consequently, there is no doubt that it has led to a vital start of 
reconstruction activities and the delivery of vital public services such as health care, education, 
water, shelter, food, and internal security (UNECA, 2003; Berry et al., 2004; Batley and Mcloughlin, 
2009). However, its long-term effect on service delivery has been questioned, as it is largely geared 
to addressing service delivery challenges temporarily and in the short term. It is an emergency relief 
or stopgap approach, and like all emergency approaches, it lacks sustainability. Moreover, it is a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach that does not take into account the peculiar contexts of the countries 
involved, such as elite capture, geography, and history of the war. Thus, in some countries such as 
Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique, and Burundi,the approach has tended to compound problems of 
access to services by marginalized groups such as women and children (Mcloughlin, 2009).
To what extent has the delivery of service by state institutions contributed to equity across disparate 
groups and helped to repair societal fractures? Is there a relationship between state responsiveness 
and service delivery? Studies on this question in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and 
Cambodia have shown that the relationship is not straightforward because the level and nature of 
fragility, violence, patronage, ethnicity, and economic growth all played a part (Eldon and Gunby, 
2009). Furthermore, health sector strengthening, for example, can contribute to state building in 
the health sector, but its impact on wider state-building remains unclear. In stabilization contexts, 
the particular challenge is how, given that the state often lacks the capacity to ensure reliable 
services, provision by external actors and donors has enhanced state legitimacy and not weakened it 
(Eldon, 2008; Call and Wyeth, 2008). From these studies, it seems that visible service delivery by state 
institutions has not resulted in state legitimacy, strengthening of the social contract, and hence the 
promotion of state-building.
The absence or weakness of state services usually means that the majority of services are delivered 
by non-state actors (including international and local non-governmental organizations, traditional 
and commercial service providers), particularly in the early recovery phase. Studies have found that 
this results in the fragmented and uneven provision of services in fragile environments in Africa 
(Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009). There is also concern that the delivery of services through non-state 
providers (NSPs) has a negative impact on the development of state legitimacy and capacity. There is 
concern that states with weak capacity cannot effectively perform the indirect stewardship roles of 
managing, coordinating, and financing NSPs of basic services. In addition, there is the question of 
how non-state providers can support the development of state capacity for direct provision in the 
long-term. 
NSPs use contracting mechanisms, widely on the theory that they increase service utilization and 
quality and improve efficiency and reduce service fragmentation. However, they have actually 
promoted precipitous decentralization in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda, 
eroded NSPs' independence, and fragmented service provision, as the NSPs are seldom able to 
provide an overall framework in which they operate (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009; GSDRC, 2009; 
BMZ, 2006; Berry et al., 2004; Moreno-Torres, 2005; PATHS, 2008; Zivetz, 2006).
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The strategies confirm that improving pro-poor service delivery is increasingly a prominent feature 
of engagement in post-conflict countries. State fragility and service delivery are seen as interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing: state fragility has a negative impact on service delivery, whereas pro-poor 
service delivery interventions have the potential to address the root causes of state fragility. 
However, the impact of the strategies on social inclusion seems limited given their “one-size-fits all” 
nature and the different contexts in which they were implemented (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008).
VI. CAPACITY CHALLENGES CONFRONTING FRAGILE/POST-CONFLICT 
COUNTRIES IN RESTORING BASIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
There is evidence in the literature that the roles and functions of government, at least during the first 
stage of reconstruction, will be very different from many of those that governments perform in non-
conflict countries. The roles and functions also differ in the first stage of transition from those that 
government will have to perform to later within the same country. During the early years of 
transition, the civil service must often recruit personnel who can implement the tasks of post-
conflict reconstruction and make progress toward a more stable system of government. The most 
urgent tasks on which government must focus in the immediate post-conflict and transition periods 
are to define the essential functions of public management and the types of administrative capacity 
that the government needs to carry them out (Rondinelli, 2006; UN, 2007). 
Given the five essential roles that governments have to perform in the aftermath of a conflict, 
several capacity challenges confront post-conflict countries in their quest to restore basic services 
and infrastructure. They include the following:
(i) The complexities of restoring governance and re-establishing the legitimacy of the government: 
Restoring effective governance is at the crux of post-conflict reconstruction. In many post-conflict 
countries, re-establishing the government's legitimacy depends on political leaders' ability to gain 
the support of diverse and sometimes hostile constituencies, rebuild a shattered economy, and 
extend or re-establish the authority of the central government over an entire national territory. 
Sustaining the peace also depends on the capacity of the public administration to restore service 
delivery, reconstruct infrastructure, and reintegrate those who have participated in or suffered from 
conflict into a more unified polity. Good governance and trust in government are essential 
conditions for maintaining peace and reconstructing countries that have been devastated by war, 
because countries emerging from crises remain vulnerable to continuing tensions (Rondinelli, 
2006). Rebuilding infrastructure and restoring services can be a complex process, especially when 
sporadic or regional hostilities continue or when the government's administrative and financial 
resources are weak (UN, 2007; Call and Wyeth, 2008).
(ii) Reforming public administration: In all stable countries, restructuring bureaucracies has usually 
been a politically contentious long-term process. This difficulty is exacerbated in post-conflict 
countries by a number of complexities. Many governments are either still struggling to establish 
their legitimacy and support or are focused on regaining stability. They are always challenged with 
19
urgent and fundamental tasks of maintaining sometimes fragile peace agreements and unifying 
diverse political factions. Taking on politically contentious changes such as public administration 
reform often falls to the bottom of their list of priorities. However, when the civil service is bloated, 
ineffective, incompetent, corrupt, or lacking in the resources to extend and improve public services 
and implement national policies, reunification and reconstruction become far more difficult and 
uncertain (Rondinelli, 2006). 
Poor coordination between central ministries and regional and local governments creates further 
challenges in rebuilding facilities and restoring services. Faulty information management and the 
lack of administrative data in sectors like health and education compound these problems. 
Furthermore, budget management in the various sectors is fragmented. Sometimes there are 
disagreements over the forms of support for reconstruction and long-term development between 
the government and international assistance organizations, as happened in the case of Angola, 
which resulted in the non-materialization of the expected shift of focus from humanitarian aid to 
development (UN, 2007; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Collier, 2007a). 
(iii) Limited feasibility of reform interventions: Social, economic, political and military environment in 
a country coupled with weak absorptive capacity of the government can limit the feasibility of 
interventions. This is further aggravated by three distinct but related stages of reform that require 
different types of administrative capacity and government personnel: 
• the immediate post-conflict reconstruction stage, often lasting five to ten years, in which the 
government must address fundamental and urgent issues of maintaining peace and security, re-
establishing governance, redeveloping the economy and reintegrating society; 
• a transition stage of an additional five to ten years, during which the government stabilizes the 
country's economy and governance structure and the civil service moves toward performing the 
types of functions usually carried out in more stable political systems and societies; and 
• a stage of stabilized governance beyond transition, in which the government effectively and 
efficiently performs its functions and the civil service performs those roles normally identified 
with growing economies and institutionalized governance. 
Each of these stages requires different functions and responsibilities of public administration. Each 
may require cadres of public servants who differ in their orientations, perceptions of the roles of 
government, competencies, and support systems. This raises the questions of whether 
conventional public administration reforms in stable governments are in appropriate in the first two 
stages of reconstruction and whether civil servant types will have to change at each stage of 
progress toward greater government stability (Rondinelli, 2006; UN, 2007; Collier, 2007a; Call and 
Wyeth, 2008).
The limited status of reform interventions is further complicated by the government's status after 
cessation of hostilities and its transformation from an authoritarian, dictatorial, or elite-controlled 
system to a more representative one, which is accompanied by the orientation of the civil service 
(Rondinelli, 2006).
(iv) The status of post-conflict situations: The types of public administration reforms needed are also 
affected by the status of fragile or post-conflict situations. Three types of post-conflict situations 
require different responses by government: 
• cessation of hostilities brought about by a decisive victory by one side that creates a self-
enforcing peace (for example, Eritrea); 
• a mediated conflict cessation, agreed by two or more warring factions, but not including other 
dissident groups or some elements of society that are unable to participate or voice concerns 
(for example, Mozambique); and 
• conflicted situations, in which one side achieves military victory without a comprehensive peace 
settlement (for example, Rwanda).
(See: Rondinelli, 2006; Call and Wyeth, 2008.)
Government's role differs in each of these three situations. In a self-enforcing situation, the 
government focuses more quickly on reconstruction and restoration activities and transition to a 
more stable government system. In mediated and conflicted situations, the government has to 
focus more intensely on building trust and legitimacy, providing security, dealing with intermittent 
outbreaks of violence, peace building, and integration of dissident groups into the governance 
process, all of which can delay both reconstruction and transition to stability, as is the experience of 
Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ethiopia (Rondinelli, 2006; UN, 2007).
The aforementioned  four challenges are further compounded by:
• internal organizational factors (such as weak administrative accounting capacity, unqualified 
staff, vested professional interests and inadequate information); 
• inter-organizational factors (such as mistrust, blurred responsibilities and the gap between 
design and implementation); and 
• external institutional factors (such as weak and inconsistent regulatory framework, political and 
economic instability, lack of policy continuity). 
Taken together, these factors have constrained the effectiveness of the state in performing 
regulation and contracting functions, which are considered“higher risk roles”of states (Batley and 
Mcloughlin, 2009) (see Table3).
The analysis on the capacity challenges facing fragile states has taught us two lessons. First, the 
variations in conditions and needs in post-conflict societies often render conventional public sector 
reform prescriptions inappropriate for restoring governance and strengthening government. 
Solutions to governance problems must be tailored, at least in the shortrun, to the specific types of 
tasks and functions that governments must perform in order to reconstruct war-torn societies. The 
specific types of institutional and organizational changes required will likely differ in countries in 
different categories (Collier, 2007a; UN, 2007).
Second, although no standard set of reforms fits all post-conflict countries, experience suggests that 
there is a widely shared perception of the characteristics needed in a government to perform 
essential public functions in the immediate post-conflict and transition periods. Whether gov-
ernance reform begins more broadly or more narrowly, each stage of progress in the post-conflict 
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Factors
Internal 
organizational 
factors
Inter-
organizational 
factors
External 
institutional 
factors
Regulation
Weak administrative and accounting 
skills and capacity for monitoring, 
performance assessment and 
enforcement
Vested professional interests
Inadequate information on price and 
performance
Lack of experience of regulation
Retention of qualified staff
Mistrust between regulator and non-
state providers
Blurred boundaries between state and 
non-state activities – the regulators 
and the regulated
Weak and inconsistent regulatory 
framework
Economic and political instability
Political pressure on regulator, and 
lack of political will for enforcement
Weak demands of civil society
Neutrality of regulatory role not 
understood
Contracting
Weak basic administrative and financial systems 
and skills
Poor information systems to compare and 
monitor contractors
Staff resistance and lack of incentive
Lack of experience and contracting, design, 
performance assessment, and enforcement
Difficulty retaining qualified staff
Lack of trust, credibility and legitimacy between 
actors
Poor definition and coordination of roles between 
state agencies and with non-state providers 
Gap between central contract design and local 
implementation agencies
Weak framework of contract law
Lack of policy continuity
Economic and financial instability; absence of 
guaranteed long-term funding
Social and political resistance to privatization
Table 3: Factors constraining state effectiveness in fragile/post-conflict countries to perform 
                higher risk roles (regulation and contracting)
Source: Batley and Mcloughlin, “State Capacity and Non-state Provision in Fragile and Conflict-affected 
States”, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre Issues Paper, February 2009: p. 33.
period is likely to be tied to larger issues of public sector institutional or structural change. In most 
crisis and post-conflict countries, restoring governance and building trust in government requires 
public administration reform (Call and Wyeth, 2008).
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VII. CONCLUSIONS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Fragile states' inability to perform their governance functions as a result of their peculiar 
circumstances, combined with the adoption of “one-size-fits-all” strategies to deliver services, have 
contributed to social exclusion in service delivery. As social inclusion, state capacity, and service 
delivery are linked in fragile/post-conflict environments, this places Africa in a double bind. 
State legitimacy is important in mobilizing citizens for reconstruction and development. For this to 
happen, the state must be able to fulfill its part of the social contract it has signed with the citizens. It 
must have or be able to develop quickly administrative capacity to establish safety and security, 
strengthen governance and participation, stabilize the economy and provide infrastructure, provide 
for emergency humanitarian needs and social welfare, and strengthen justice and reconciliation 
organizations. 
These roles have major implications for the coherence of service provision as well as the role and 
capacity of state agencies to monitor standards, quality, and access, and to ensure consistency 
across different social groups and geographical boundaries. It also has implications for the role of 
the line department functionaries for whom a core responsibility is the management of public 
resources and the appointment and remuneration of government staff. Pluralization of service 
provision and delegation of responsibility to lower levels of government highlight the importance of 
state regulatory capacity to guard against excessive fragmentation and the erosion of policy 
coherence (Joshi, 2006; Devarajan and Widlund, 2007; Krishna, 2007; Birner and von Braun, 2009).
One of the most important effects of state legitimacy on social mobilization for reconstruction and 
development is the development of values that support self-determination, inclusion, participation, 
and empowerment in governance and economic spheres. Each of these is essential to overcome the 
status quo and prevent relapse into conflict. To emerge from state failure and re-establish 
sustainable governance, stakeholders must be convinced by the state that it is in their interests to 
negotiate and create democratic structures, a collective identity, and authority patterns with shared 
power for the common good (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002). The focus is on fostering national 
unity and building national pride, each of which is predicated on some sense of shared values and 
national identity. Since trust is problematic, the success of these efforts depends upon building 
confidence. Governance that incorporates these values can help develop confidence through 
transparency and accountability mechanisms as well as specification of contracts, roles and 
responsibilities, and standard operating procedures (Luhmann, 1988). However, in situations where 
identity-based politics have deeply embedded conflict within the society, the most that a democratic 
government may be able to achieve is “accommodation amongst … conflicting interests, hoping 
that value change will follow in the long run” (Crook, 2001: 1). 
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that if conflict resolution, consensus-building, and creating 
citizen ownership for change are necessary for reconstruction, then the establishment of some 
democratic processes must be considered as first steps in governance reconstruction. Ignoring 
democratization can also undermine stability in the long run by signaling that socioeconomic or 
political development is subject to the whims of a limited set of actors. By dealing with this problem, 
the state will also ensure its legitimacy for social mobilization (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002).
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In designing policy measures to improve service delivery for social inclusion in fragile/post-conflict 
situations, the challenges are to find and use appropriate approaches and options that fit different 
and often rapidly changing needs and conditions; balance complex and sometimes countervailing 
objectives and pressures; and act in a timely manner to properly sequence aid in achieving goals over 
time (Rondinelli, 2006; UN, 2007). 
Determining the most appropriate and feasible ways of improving social inclusion, state legitimacy, 
state capacity, and service delivery in fragile and post-conflict situations can be accomplished only by 
understanding the needs and conditions in each situation. Careful diagnosis of the requirements and 
needs of government to perform recovery and reconstruction tasks is essential in designing 
appropriate assistance policies and for successfully implementing them. This requires not only the 
formulation of appropriate, balanced, timely, and effective approaches, strategies, and options but 
also the integration of the crucial sets of factors into plans and programs.
Policy measures to improve social inclusion, state legitimacy, state capacity, and service delivery in 
fragile or post-conflict situations are likely to be more successful if they clearly reflect the following:
(I) An understanding of strategic conditions and needs within fragile/post-conflict countries, 
including the challenges that governments face, their strengths and weaknesses in meeting 
those challenges, the most critical tasks and functions that governments must carry out in a 
five-toten-year timeframe, and the deficiencies in government capacity for providing services 
and implementing reconstruction policies (UN, 2007);
(ii) A recognition of potential obstacles to reform, including the potential for overcoming or 
preventing the most frequent bottlenecks or hurdles to restructuring government 
(Rondinelli, 2006);
(iii) An assessment of the feasibility of approaches to international assistance, including the ability 
to implement an assistance program that meets all or most of the donors' principles for 
preventing aid dependency (Batley, 2004); 
(iv) A clear recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative assistance approaches and 
options and of the conditions under which they are likely to be feasible (Rondinelli, 2006);
(v) Acknowledgment that service delivery is ultimately a public responsibility and interventions 
should be devised so as to restore the public service delivery track in the long term. It is 
therefore important that handover mechanisms be designed from the very outset of 
programs so that initiatives can be linked to and ultimately incorporated into the public service 
delivery track (Mcloughlin, 2009);
(vi) Recognition that the strategic coherence of the donor community is important and alignment 
and harmonization are key efforts to further this agenda. The issue of building state capacity is 
at the very core of alignment efforts: alignment with government's systems and/or priorities 
reduces the possibility of undermining state institutions by creating parallel mechanisms of 
service delivery. Efforts to harmonize the response of the donor community are key to making 
efficient use of resources and, where possible, reducing transaction costs and fragmentation 
under government guidance and the overall policy framework (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009);
(vii) Understanding that the instruments and funding mechanism used to finance service delivery 
initiatives should be flexible, predictable, reliable, and longterm. This is of crucial importance 
for building state capacity, a long term and difficult task, and for ensuring that states are not 
underfunded during the crucial the transitional phase (Call and Wyeth, 2008);
(viii) Recognition that more efforts from the donor community should target poor and vulnerable 
groups that are most affected by state fragility and by ineffective service delivery. Efforts 
should aim to remove, or at least mitigate, supply- and demand-side barriers of access to 
services that may limit or prevent those groups from accessing basic services (Paranello and 
Darcy, 2008);
(ix) Commitment to designing and implementing service delivery interventions that are premised 
on sustainability. However, while sustainable service delivery interventions need to be 
promoted, it is equally important to keep in mind that building sustainable systems for service 
delivery in the short to medium term may be unrealistic and an overly ambitious plan. In this 
connection, the concept of “good enough governance,” in which initiatives should be realistic 
and achievable, aims to attain “visible results in the short term, however modest, to build 
momentum for future reform” (DfID, 2005: 21); and
(x) Capacity develpment, which is lacking in fragile/post-conflict states, must be achieved via a 
holistic approach that has buy in from all the major stakeholders. Uncoordinated aid for 
reform by multiple donors that places heavy administrative, financial, or technical burdens on 
already weak government ministries and agencies is unlikely to succeed in post-conflict 
countries. Consequently, the most appropriate way to strengthen public administration is 
through the gradual but progressive transformations to meet emerging needs and challenges 
as fragile or post-conflict countries go through a process of reconstruction, transition, and 
stabilization (OECD/DAC, 2008 a; b).
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